An Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 experienced a panel blowout in flight, leading to an emergency landing. This incident triggered U.S. regulators to order the temporary grounding of 171 Boeing 737 MAX 9 jets for safety checks.
In this article, we share the breakdown of the actions taken by regulators and airlines in response to the Alaska Airlines B737 MAX 9 incident. Furthermore, we list the current operators of B737 MAX 9 in the world, and which has the same configuration as Alaska Airlines aircraft.
United Finds Loose Bolts on Door Plugs During Inspection
United Airlines, one of the two U.S. carriers that operate this variant with the mid-cabin exit door plugs, said that its preliminary checks found loose bolts on several of its ground MAX 9 planes.
United has reportedly found closer to 10 planes with loose bolts during its preliminary checks, up from an initial five, as reported by The Air Current.
“Since we began preliminary inspections on Saturday, we have found instances that appear to relate to installation issues in the door plug – for example, bolts that needed additional tightening. These findings will be remedied by our Tech Ops team to safely return the aircraft to service.”
Uniter Airlines spokesperson
Regulator Actions
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Following the Alaska Airlines incident, the FAA issued a directive grounding 171 affected 737 MAX 9 planes until inspections are completed.
On the 6th of January, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) which requires immediate inspections of all the B737 Max 9 aircraft equipped with the door plugs.
“The FAA is requiring immediate inspections of certain Boeing 737 MAX 9 planes before they can return to flight, Safety will continue to drive our decision-making as we assist the NTSB’s investigation into Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. We have grounded the affected airplanes, and they will remain grounded until the FAA is satisfied that they are safe.”
FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker
It is being reported that the inspections would take about four to eight hours per aircraft.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
The NTSB has initiated an investigation into the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 incident. A team of investigators has been dispatched to Portland to thoroughly examine the aircraft and determine the cause of the incident. According to the U.S. NTSB Chair, Jennifer Homendy, the panel was recovered on Sunday.
The team comprises technical experts representing the FAA, Boeing, and Alaska Airlines, as well as representatives from pilot and flight attendant unions.
Moreover, no data was available on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) because it was not retrieved within two hours.
“There was a lot going on, on the flight deck and on the plane. It’s a very chaotic event. The circuit breaker for the CVR (cockpit voice recorder) was not pulled. The maintenance team went out to get it, but it was right at about the two-hour mark.”
NTSB Chair, Jennifer Homendy
International Responses
Brazil
Brazil’s aviation regulator National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) clarified that there are no active Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft in the country.
The agency further stated that it adheres to the FAA directive and due to the absence of Boeing 737 MAX 9 jets in operation in the country, this will not affect flight operations in Brazil.
Canada
Transport Canada confirmed that no Boeing 737 MAX 9 planes are currently in use by any Canadian operators and the agency further stated that the FAA ruling has been applied to all flights in the country.
European Union and the United Kingdom
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) adopted the FAA directive but noted that no EU member state airlines operate the aircraft type with the affected configuration.
Moreover, the UK Civil Aviation Authority clarified that no UK-registered planes are affected, but any MAX 9 entering its airspace must comply with the FAA directive.
Asian Countries
China’s regulator is seeking further details on the incident and considering potential actions based on the response. China was the first country to ground MAX flights in 2019.
Whereas, India’s DGCA confirmed the satisfactory completion of one-time inspections for all the active Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft in the country. However, none of the Indian airlines operate the 737 MAX 9 model.
However, the Indonesian aviation safety body has grounded three Boeing 737 MAX 9 planes operated by Lion Air, emphasizing different configurations from the Alaska Airlines incident.
United Arab Emirates
The civil aviation authority in the UAE confirmed that none of its national carriers have planes affected by the FAA order. flydubai operates three MAX 9 aircraft with a deactivated mid-aft exit door configuration, which is not affected by the directive.
Speaking on the recent B737 MAX incident Emirates President Tim Clark said that “they’ve had quality control problems for a long time now, and this is just another manifestation of that.”
Current Boeing 737 MAX 9 Operators
- 11 Boeing 737 MAX 9 operators
- 5 Airlines use a mid-cabin exit door plug
- Airlines globally operate 215 Max 9 aircraft
Here are the current operators of the Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft and the status of the mid-cabin exit door plugs among these carriers.
| S. No. | Airlines | Number of Active B737 MAX 9 | Mid-Cabin Exit Door Plug Status |
| 1 | Aeromexico | 19 | Yes |
| 2 | Air Tanzania | 1 | No |
| 3 | Alaska Airlines | 65 | Yes |
| 4 | Copa Airlines | 29 | 21 with Door Plugs 8 without Door Plugs |
| 5 | Corendon Dutch Airlines | 2 | No |
| 6 | flydubai | 3 | No |
| 7 | Icelandair | 3 | No |
| 8 | Lion Air | 3 | No |
| 9 | SCAT Airlines | 5 | No |
| 10 | Turkish Airlines | 5 | Yes |
| 11 | United Airlines | 79 | Yes |
Airlines Response
Alaska and United Airlines are the only two U.S. passenger airlines that operate the B737 MAX 9 variant. These two airlines operate nearly two-thirds of the 215 MAX 9 aircraft in service around the world.
Alaska Airlines
Alaska Airlines promptly grounded its 65 Boeing 737 MAX 9 planes following the incident, later returning 18 to service after maintenance checks before grounding them again.
“Following tonight’s event on Flight 1282, we have decided to take the precautionary step of temporarily grounding our fleet of 65 Boeing MAX-9 aircraft. Each aircraft will be returned to service only after completion of full maintenance and safety inspections.”
Alaska Airlines spokesperson
The carrier further said that it had cancelled 170 flights on Sunday with around 60 more flights being cancelled on Monday following the FAA directive.
United Airlines
United Airlines, the larger operator of the B737 MAX 9, has also grounded all of its 737 MAX 9 aircraft as it awaits the FAA-required inspections.
“United has temporarily suspended service on all Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft to conduct inspections required by the FAA. We are working with the FAA to clarify the inspection process and the requirements for returning all MAX 9 aircraft to service,” the airline stated.
According to reports, United cancelled 230 flights on Sunday, or 8% of its scheduled departures.
Copa Airlines
Panamanian carrier Copa Airlines has also temporarily grounded 21 of its 737 MAX 9 aircraft which feature the mid-cabin exit door plugs. It expects to resume normal operations within 24 hours, with some delays and cancellations anticipated.
The flights affected by this temporary suspension are some departing from Panama to Ecuador, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, and others arriving in the Central American country from Brazil, Uruguay, Honduras, the United States, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.
Other Carriers
The rest of the B737 MAX 9 operators, including Fiji Airways, flydubai, Turkish Airlines, Aeromexico, and Icelandair, reported their unaffected status or took precautionary measures by inspecting and grounding select aircraft.
Turkish Airlines withdrew five aircraft from service for inspection, whereas the Mexican flag carrier also grounded affected jets for inspection.
Icelandair, which operates four of the aircraft type said that it is not affected by the FAA grounding of Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft.
“It has been confirmed that the issue is related to equipment that is not a part of Icelandair’s Boeing 737 MAX 9 configuration.”
Icelandair spokesperson
This incident and subsequent actions mark a significant challenge for Boeing, as regulatory authorities and airlines respond to ensure the safety of the 737 MAX 9 fleet. Ongoing investigations will shed light on the specific issues leading to the panel blowout and the necessary measures required to address those issues.
Source: Reuters, FlightRadar24
@Barbsright thank you for the CNN article reference. I don’t understand why Dave Calhoun hasn’t been fired by the Board already. They need an engineer at the top,
This “CNN”-article is a must-read. It allows one to really understand what has gone wrong with “The Boeing Company”, arguably “GE”, and no-doubt a number of other large companies. The year 1997 seems to be pivotal as the starting-point of the decay of “The Boeing Company”.
I was not able to put a direct-link into this post because the system would not allow it.
Here is the article’s title:
“Boeing was once known for safety and engineering. But critics say an emphasis on profits changed that”
From the “CNN”-article
“Investigations revealing sloppy work, including loose or missing bolts, instances of tools, trash and even empty tequila bottles left inside planes built for government clients.”
“He points to a report from the Ethiopian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau that looked at both fatal crashes and found that “These accidents were triggered by production quality defects that… presented as intermittent system malfunctions.”
Without the build quality issues causing malfunctions, the design flaw feature of the plane that forced the nose of the plane down would not have turned on, and the flights would not have crashed, according to the Ethiopian report.
But that finding got little attention as the US National Transportation Safety Board and the FAA focused on design flaws rather than the build quality issues, Pierson said.”
Here we are not in NEAR-MISS perimeter, it happened and so can happen other times , in QA it has to be ESCALATION and has to be extended to all’ Boeing products !
(We have not all the info for a 4M & 5WH analisys so all we write is speculation).
About Bolt unscrewed there are a lot of solution to prevent (Stanley, Atlas Copco,Bosch….) and filter/intercepting ( ex Rockwell Datamyte, since 1987 and largely used in automotive) dose Boeing know ?
“ About Bolt unscrewed there are a lot of solution to prevent (Stanley, Atlas Copco,Bosch….) and filter/intercepting ( ex Rockwell Datamyte, since 1987 and largely used in automotive) dose Boeing know ?”
Very-interesting. Would you explain to me in detail, who does not have an education/work-history in manufacturing, what the ‘solutions’ are. Thank you.
Also to answer your question: “…does Boeing know?” I will make the inference that “The Boeing Company” knows different solutions that would solve this problem, but they are more expensive to make standard on the “Boeing 737 MAX”-type-aircraft.
I am on a personal crusade to help both those who speak English as a first language and those that have taken it up as a second or third language. The word aircrafts is possessive. More than one aircraft IS aircraft, not aircrafts. Similarly, maintenance is not preventative but preventive. Equipment shares a similar status as aircraft. We do not say equipments. I recognize that English has some silly rules. But when I communicate in another language other than my mother tongue of English, I try to observe the nuances of that language so as not to embarrass myself or give the reader cause to question my credibility.
Aeromexico has many 737 Max 9 aircrafts in their fleet, after COPA is the 2nd more important owner of this type of aircraft and you don’t mention a single world, interview to any AM executives to know their expectations and actions.
I am so glad I am retired.
I am so glad I am retired, as well. I always had a problem with people/businesses that had a lackadaisical-attitude, when I was still working. I think I would be driven-to-distraction at a lot of workplaces nowadays, if I had to work.
By the Leeham News Team
Jan. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: It’s not supposed to happen.
The door plug on the Boeing 737-9 MAX isn’t supposed to separate from the airplane in flight, as it did on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 this year.
The investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is in its infancy. Early evidence suggests four bolts intended to prevent the door plug from shifting in its attachment brackets either failed or weren’t installed. Inspections after the 1282 incident by Alaska, and United Airlines found loose bolts in other MAX 9s. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Jan. 6 grounded the 171 MAX 9s operated by the two carriers until inspections and repairs, if needed, are completed.
Boeing CEO David Calhoun, while telling CNBC that he wasn’t pointing fingers, did precisely that. He said Spirit AeroSystems had a “quality escape,” adding that Boeing failed to catch it, so it also had a quality escape.
How could this happen? The NTSB probe will presumably figure this out. Spirit ships the 737-9 fuselages with the door plug installed. Conflicting reporting suggests that Spirit is supposed to install the door plugs in the final, secure condition; or these are shipped with the plugs in place but in a condition that Boeing would later secure. The NTSB will sort this out, too.
Regardless, Boeing should have inspected the door plugs and assured these are in final condition prior to delivery. The Seattle Times reported on Jan. 14 that contrary to other reports, Boeing doesn’t open or remove the door plug when the MAX 9 is in final assembly. A retired Boeing safety employee with assembly line experience says Spirit ships the door plugs in a temporary condition, expecting that Boeing may remove them during final assembly.
Special inspection procedure of the door plug
LNA outlined Boeing’s inspection procedures in a Jan. 8 post. In the event, for whatever reason, Boeing does open or remove the door plug, there is a special procedure that should be followed to ensure the plug is properly reinstalled.
Here is that procedure.
The quality escapes referred to by Calhoun are inspection procedures. Failing to catch something in an inspection is also called an inspection escape.
What is outlined below is a theory, and not proven fact with the MAX 9 involved, or others in which discrepancies have been found. This procedure is related detailing Boeing’s procedure, just as LNA’s Jan. 8 post outlined procedures.
If Boeing, for any reason, removed the door plug on Alaska’s MAX 9, failure to reinstall the plug properly may not be an inspection escape. An inspection escape means that a planned installation/re-installation operation was inspected, and the mechanic and inspector got it wrong. While not impossible, this is a tough theory to accept, given the four-step inspection process outlined in the Jan. 8 post.
On the other hand, unplanned removal and installation calls for another procedure.
Boeing goes to great lengths to document unplanned removals by logging all the disassembly steps on the ship’s record paper. Quality Assurance inspects the reassembly process of the unplanned removal event. This door plug’s poor installation could, in theory, be the result of a production shortcut where the shop needed the door out of the way. The door could have been reinstalled incorrectly. The retired Boeing safety employee says the door plugs are often removed.
Unplanned removals happen “a lot,” the retired Boeing employee told LNA. “There are a multitude of reasons,” he said.
Cost-cutting on inspectors; new workforce
If the unplanned removal proves to hold water, and as noted, this is only hypothesis, then how could the inspection process break down? And how could experienced assembly line workers miss either escapes from Spirit or reinstalling the door plug properly?
The roots may go back years.
Under the regime of former CEO Dennis Muilenburg, quality inspectors were laid off and their duties assigned to others. Boeing’s touch-labor union, the IAM 751, protested that this was unsafe. The protests largely fell on deaf ears.
“I don’t call them quality escapes anymore. I call them safety escapes because Boeing doesn’t have a quality organization anymore,” the retired Boeing safety employee said. A procedure called “Quality Buyback” has been reduced over the years, he said.
In its May 2019 Aero Mechanic employee newsletter, the IAM 751 wrote that it continued to object to Boeing’s plan to eliminate quality assurance inspectors. The union vowed to have its members “reveal instances where Boeing is not following its own internal process.”
“Removing inspections and discovering defects further down line will cause an abundance of out-of-sequence work, [and] more damage to the airplane through rework….”
“We have engaged…in what we see as a long battle to protect the integrity of our manufacturing process,” the union wrote in its newsletter.
When the MAX was grounded in May 2019 for what would be 21 months, Boeing laid off many of its final assembly line workers. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in May 2020, Boeing laid off or offered early retirement to thousands or workers company wide, including more from the 737 FAL.
When production resumes in May 2021, ahead of the recertification the following November, Boeing had to hire new employees without FAL experience. A learning curve is necessary for efficient production.
Returning the MAX 9 to service
The FAA grounded the US MAX 9s on Jan. 6. Some other airlines followed the FAA’s lead. Initially, it was thought that inspecting the door plugs and making any fixes would be a quick process. But more than a week later, the FAA was still requiring details from Boeing and that 40 inspections and repairs (if required) would have to be completed before return to service was approved.
Why is the FAA being so slow? There are a couple of theories.
The first is that the incident involves Boeing and the MAX. The FAA was burned by the certification process of the MAX in the beginning, which was revealed during the 2019 grounding and accident investigations of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines. One theory suggests that the FAA isn’t going to get burned again.
It’s common knowledge within the airline community that the relationship between Boeing and the FAA has never recovered from the original MAX crisis. The FAA removed authority from Boeing to certify new MAXes as airworthy. The FAA must sign off on each delivery. This hand slapping was later extended to the 787 when production and quality problems were discovered at the Charleston final assembly line.
Certifying the MAX 7 and 10
Recertifying the MAX after the crash-related groundings proved to be an arduous process. So is certification of the MAX 7, which otherwise is ready to go, and the MAX 10, for which flight testing is in its early stages. But certification of the MAX 7 has taken far longer than anyone expected.
The FAA asks questions and Boeing responds. This generates more questions and more responses. And the cycle repeats, over and over again. Shortly before the Alaska incident, Boeing asked for an exemption for the MAX 7 from a safety regulation. Doubts already existed whether the FAA would grant the exemption. Now, doing so seems unlikely.
Another theory why the FAA is moving slowly on the MAX 9 is, perhaps unsurprisingly, politics. Some members of Congress were quick to demand hearings about the FAA oversight of Boeing, again. The FAA has, once more, come under criticism for its handling of the entire MAX history.
The FAA launched a formal investigation into the MAX 9 incident, in parallel to that of the NTSB.
The FAA is also expected to receive this month a draft of a safety audit authorized during the original MAX crisis. Members of the special committee included experts from across aviation. LNA has learned that the draft conclusions won’t be favorable to Boeing. There is no public release date of this report that’s been announced.
Stan Deal message to Employees
Boeing today made available a message to employees from Stan Deal, the CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. It’s reprinted here in its entirety.
Updates on 737-9 and quality actions
***This message is to all Commercial Airplanes employees.***
As we continue to respond to the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident, our team has been working with the five affected airlines to inspect their 737-9 fleet. They have been examining and collecting measurements around the mid-exit door plugs to ensure they are installed per specifications.
While we complete these tasks to earn Federal Aviation Administration approval to unground the affected 737-9s, our team is also taking a hard look at our quality practices in our factories and across our production system.
We have taken important steps in recent years to strengthen our Quality Management System’s (QMS) foundation and its layers of protection. But, the AS1282 accident and recent customer findings make clear that we are not where we need to be. To that end, we are taking immediate actions to bolster quality assurance and controls across our factories.
More quality inspections: We are planning additional inspections throughout the build process at Boeing and at Spirit. These checks will provide one more layer of scrutiny on top of the thousands of inspections performed today across each 737 airplane, and build on the reviews we have implemented to catch potential non-conformances. Since 2019, we have increased the number of Commercial Airplanes quality inspectors by 20% and we plan to make more investments in the Quality function.
Team sessions on quality: We are planning additional sessions for our teams to gather and refocus on the fundamentals of our QMS, take advantage of our expanded training programs, and recommit to improving quality and compliance.
Boeing review of Spirit work: We have deployed a team to work alongside Spirit AeroSystems to complement the existing teammates on the ground. Our team is now inspecting Spirit’s installation of the mid-exit door plug and approving them before the fuselage section can be shipped to Boeing. We are also inspecting more than 50 other points in Spirit’s build process and assessing their build plans against engineering specifications.
Airline oversight inspections: We are opening our factories to 737 operators for additional oversight inspections to review our production and quality procedures. Spirit will do the same and we will learn from our customers’ insights and findings.
Independent assessment: An outside party will be brought in to thoroughly review the Quality Management System at Commercial Airplanes and suggest further improvements.
And as we prepare new 737-9s for delivery, we will conduct the same thorough inspections of the mid-exit door plugs as mandated by the FAA. Customer representatives will continue to have access to anything they want to see onboard their airplane before delivery.
These actions are separate from the FAA’s investigation and the agency’s plan to increase oversight of 737-9 production. We will cooperate fully and transparently with both as we work to restore trust with our regulator and our customers. And as the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation proceeds, we will take additional steps to improve our practices as the facts and findings dictate.
Everything we do must conform to the requirements in our QMS. Anything less is unacceptable. It is through this standard that we must operate to provide our customers and their passengers complete confidence in Boeing airplanes. Let each one of us take personal accountability and recommit ourselves to this important work.
Stan
@Barbsright we are seeing the same problem in healthcare. Business people with $$$ in their eyes cutting expenses regardless of the consequences so they can collect their fat bonuses. Meanwhile patient care suffers. The thing is that the CEO of the hospital is probably the least important person. Without him, or her, healthcare would still be provided. Maybe would not be as well organized, but it would still go on. And not one nickel of income is generated by the CEO. Unfortunately, most of these CEOs don’t have the insight to know that and act like litle kings.
Yes, the world has become a ‘winner take all’ “Casino Economy”’. My mother was a RN (Registered Nurse), and my father was a physician. They were very-responsible with the medical-care they provided to their respective patients. That focus on providing ‘quality’ seems to no longer be rewarded in any field, nowadays. The ‘culture’ of the world is about making as much money as one can, and then let others clean-up-the-mess. It is time for responsible people to become the majority of people in the U.S.A., and the world.
For Barbsright
Legend has it that many years ago, Donald Douglas showed up at a company meeting to discuss a new aircraft. He went around the room asking what discipline each participant represented. They all came from accounting and finance; not a single engineer was in the room. Mr. Douglas got up and left the meeting. It was reported he retired shortly thereafter.
When corporate financial value becomes paramount in company strategy, other values suffer. Perhaps the 737 Max problems are a result of shareholder value becoming more important than the safety of the traveling public. One could also question the lack of FAA involvement in ensuring design, testing and manufacturing procedures are either met or exceeded. Loose bolts? Questionable fuselage plugs? One might question where QA was during all of this.
Ramping up production is not a cure for poor stock performance. Making safe and credible airframes does. But once you have lost credibility, it is difficult to regain it.
I have observed that all the people that I have met who work in aviation, are a certain type. I noticed this when I took my ‘Ground School Course’, at my University. All pilots/, flight-attendants and/or aviation-factory-workers are the same. It is like the people who work on the railroad. It is its own ‘culture’. What happened was that people who fit that ‘culture’ were removed from its leadership, and replaced by people who only cared about money. This has happened in other industries, as well. It can be described as the ‘de-talentization’ of U.S. Industry. It seems that ‘employees’ are considered a cost-area, rather than ‘assets’ to a respective corporation. Yet, ‘the company is the people’. Without the people working cooperatively toward a common-goal, nothing would get done at any respective enterprise. I cannot even comprehend just how much ‘human talent’ “The Boeing Company” has thrown away since the 1990’s. The most important question is, for the U.S.A.’s National Security: Can “The Boeing Company” be saved?
For those who have wondered how this is seen from outside “The Boeing Company”, this is what Kelly Evens wrote on her “The Exchange”-blog, on 01/11/2024.
‘The Exchange with Kelly Evans
FROM THE DESK OF KELLY EVANS
TOP OF MY MIND
Here’s an incredible fact: Boeing today is worth dramatically less than it was in 2019, even though it was then coming off of two fatal crashes in two years, and the S&P 500 is up 70% during that time.
What makes this all the more remarkable is that the company operates in an effective duopoly, with Airbus as its only real competitor in the market. Boeing should be a relatively simple and lucrative investment story. In the past five years, however–and even today, with travel and leisure stocks trading at all-time highs post-pandemic–it has been anything but.
The stock’s recent skid is a direct result of yet another problem with its troubled line of 737 Max planes. Last Friday, a hole blew open mid-flight on an Alaska Airlines flight, ripping a boy’s shirt off and sucking it out the window. That could have been a child, was everyone’s stunned reaction. The plane, fortunately, was only flying around 16,000 feet; at higher altitude the incident surely would have been worse.
Boeing’s CEO, Dave Calhoun, came on CNBC yesterday to apologize and discuss what had happened. “How did an unsafe airplane fly in the first place?” I asked him. He admitted to a “quality escape” during their manufacturing process. Was this the fault of supplier Spirit AeroSystems, which made the plugged door that had ripped open? Or was Boeing responsible for not fully tightening its bolts? The answer was not clear.
And the trouble with a company that operates in a near-duopoly is that the analyst and investment community is rarely that critical of it. It was very difficult to find analysts and investors, even after the fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019, who were bearish. We kept hearing the same mantra: the stock is “worth buying on a pullback,” there “haven’t been major setbacks to the 737 Max return to service,” etc., etc.
And yet here we are, four years later, and the company has gone from a peak market cap of nearly $250 billion in 2019, to just $136 billion as of this writing. More than $100 billion in corporate value has been wiped out in that relatively short (and overall stock-market bullish) period of time.
I asked shareholder Tony Bancroft of Gabelli Funds about that yesterday. Simply put, the MAX problems have been a capital hole, he explained. “When we get back to production rates at pre-2018 levels, there is going to be a lot of free cash flow for Boeing,” and a rebound in its valuation, he said. Investors have been hoping for a near-doubling of 737 MAX plane production in the next few years.
So perhaps that does make now the time to “buy the stock on a pullback.” That is, if the company can actually sort out its problems and get production back to where it could be. Or perhaps the investment community, and U.S. regulators, need to start holding Boeing more accountable for its problems.
See you at 1 p.m!
Kelly
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If what ‘Boeing’ is doing was good for ‘the Public’, then its value would have increased not decreased over the last 5 years.
To Barbsright: Thanks. Just doing my job. We also need to thank Sam Chui for setting this site up. Hopefully it will encourage more people to participate.
In response to Barbsright, you accuse me of missing the point. Your quote: “I think you miss the overall problem. The very-existence of a ‘plug’ that can pop-off an aircraft, is the major-problem.” Perhaps you missed what I had written: “Questions in future may center on an understanding of the reasoning behind the replacement of the exit door with the fuselage plug. Who made the decision that this was necessary? What was the purpose?”
You also wrote: “For people like myself, who know more things about aviation, than the-general-public, we can easily discuss what most likely went wrong and how to fix the respective problem. The following information has just come from a “PBS”-news-report.” In response: I am an A&P. I have been involved in the development, design, manufacture and support of aircraft for over fifty-five years. I am a FAASteam member. I have fought corporate greed and FAA hesitancy to take action. I have been a Part 91 Chief of Inspections. I have participated in the review of numerous aircraft incidents and crashes. I have also learned that we cannot ‘easily discuss what most likely went wrong…’ until we are sure all the data is in. And that means all data must be vetted thoroughly from reliable sources, not just a PBS news item.
My concern in the larger sense, is the potential focus on shareholder value as opposed to an emphasis on aviation enthusiasm. There may be a culture that extends from the boardroom down to the shop floor that concerns itself more with just being another job. There are many questions needing to be asked and answered that address every aspect of the aviation community. Throwing Boeing management under the bus is a simple and inadequate solution. The problem may extend well beyond them. Witness the continuing posts that have already found the source of the problem in a rush to judgement. Again, it takes the NTSB more than just a quick glance at the problem.
Thank you for your work to make aviations safer.
“I have fought corporate greed and FAA hesitancy to take action.”
I am sorry that you had to do that. Our society should have more respect for the value of human-life. But I am glad you were there to fight for public-saftey. Again, thank you for doing that.
In response to P. Du Cann, we both have failed to communicate adequately. Firstly, I cautioned about jumping to conclusions. You have put blame squarely on Boeing management. That is usually the first suspect. However, this might be premature and even the captain of a ship cannot be cognizant of every single action taking place on their vessel. They do ultimately assume responsibility, especially when things go wrong.
Questions in future may center on an understanding of the reasoning behind the replacement of the exit door with the fuselage plug. Who made the decision that this was necessary? What was the purpose? I agree with your sentiments with regards to following accepted processes and procedures for designing and testing. Did it meet or exceed company and FAA requirements? That remains to be verified. What I mean by did it meet or exceed the specs, what was written in the engineering and the manufacturing planning? Could this incident have been the result of material failure?
Subsequent to your response, it has been found that there were several United aircraft that had bolts holding the plug that were loose. Does this mean 1) the planning was incorrect (meaning engineering failed to ensure proper torque callouts were included) 2) were workers on the assembly line in a hurry, if so 3) what was the QA inspection called for and finally 4) were assembly people coerced to get the job done?
Your emphatic rebuttal to what I had written goes against the pattern we have learned to follow. That is why it takes the National Transportation Safety Board months before it can make pronouncement on its findings. It takes time to collect all the data and analyze it. It is not clearly anyone’s responsibility at this time.
I think you miss the overall problem. The very-existence of a ‘plug’ that can pop-off an aircraft, is the major-problem. If the plug could not pop-off, then ‘the accident’ would not have happened based on the condition of the door-plug when it was found in the teacher’s backyard. One should design things so certain ‘accidents’ cannot happen. You are correct that we should not jump to conclusions, but with the recent-history of “The Boeing Company”, giving them the common-curtesy of ‘not jumping to conclusions’ when one of their products fails-miserably, has long-since-passed. For people like myself, who know more things about aviation, than the-general-public, we can easily discuss what most likely went wrong and how to fix the respective problem. The following information has just come from a “PBS”-news-report.
“The Boeing 737 Max 9 jetliner was not being used for flights over large bodies of water, after a warning light related to a pressurization problem lit up on three different flights. Alaska Airlines restricted the aircraft so it could land quickly if the warning light reappeared.“
Here is the whole “PBS”-news-report from which the quote was sourced.
https://www.opb.org/article/2024/01/08/portland-teacher-recounts-finding-boeing-door-plug-in-yard/
“Firstly, I cautioned about jumping to conclusions. You have put blame squarely on Boeing management. That is usually the first suspect. However, this might be premature and even the captain of a ship cannot be cognizant of every single action taking place on their vessel. They do ultimately assume responsibility, especially when things go wrong.“
Victor Craft, you have been proven correct. I do not know if you read my latest response! but it appears that “Alaska Airlines” is also responsible for what happened.
“The Boeing 737 Max 9 jetliner was not being used for flights over large bodies of water, after a warning light related to a pressurization problem lit up on three different flights. Alaska Airlines restricted the aircraft so it could land quickly if the warning light reappeared.“
Here is the whole “PBS”-news-report from which the quote was sourced.
https://www.opb.org/article/2024/01/08/portland-teacher-recounts-finding-boeing-door-plug-in-yard/
Here are two news-articles which is more in-depth, and well-worth-reading.
https://www.cnn.com/business/boeing-737-max/index.html
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/maker-boeing-door-plugs-sued-quality-failures-midair-alaska-airlines-b-rcna133291
why can’t have system design where the door is inward projecting and not outward projecting? Outward projecting has to be done manually, or something to that effect. That way the plane is sealed shut. Just thinking out loud.
Boeing has now shown itself to be extremely lackadaisical when it comes to air safety. Their stupidity in deciding that no additional pilot training was needed for the MAX aircraft was catastrophic. And now this. Why the hell would they “plug” a door? Leave the damn door on. Any idiot knows that taking parts on and off increases the chance of an error being made. And P. Du Cann’s comment that a pressurized aircraft should have a plug on the inside is absolutely correct. Another example of the rot that is occurring by putting accountants with no engineering knowledge in charge of engineering companies.
Fired former employees of Spirit Aerospace filed lawsuits for retaliation for reporting safety and quality issues! Right to work state, Right to keep your mouth shut and not get fired!
I’ve been in aerospace for over 35 years, I’ve seen a steady decline in skilled labor, Assemblers with no previous manufacturing experience, Inspectors with no aerospace experience, Managers straight out of college with no experience. I’ve worked for vendors while on layoff where there is no Union. SPIRIT IS NON-UNION, RIGHT TO WORK, RIGHT TO KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT AND KEEP YOUR JOB! SAY SOMETHING AND GET FIRED!
I cannot understand how “Boeing” was allowed to use a panel that could fail-catastrophically, in order ‘to plug’ the door-space. pressurized aircraft use “plug-doors”, which are able to fail safely because the area around the door is smaller than the space the door enters through. this means the door can only be opened when the pressure in the aircraft is close to the pressure outside the aircraft. “Boeing” needs to replace all ‘plug panels’-door with plug-doors. they should’ve never been allowed to have some set up like that, that could fail catastrophically as this one did. These entries need to be failsafe the only way to make them failsafe is to replace them with plug-door-panels.
One shouldn’t jump to conclusions until a thorough investigation has been conducted. However, it does initially appear there is a potential manufacturing procedural issue that needs to be addressed. Questions to be raised are 1) was the torque on the bolt insufficient? 2) did QA fail to insure proper torquing during manufacturing? 3) was there an engineering mistake in the torque callout? As with most accidents of this nature, we discover that a series of missteps lead up to the incident. Boeing has been under the microscope with the 737 Max along with Boeing personnel even complaining about the lack of attention to detail on the assembly line for this and some of its other products. Could this be indicative of a rush to get planes out the door?
Sir, clearly this catastrophic failure issue (a very near-miss) is not a manufacturing problem. It is a fundamental Boeing design and development issue.
It can be seen that the Boeing management team does not know the basic engineering principles of a “Fail Safe” door plug.
As the equipment failure danger is a serious risk to crew, passengers and the aircraft; any measures taken to “plug” the emergency door aperture with anything other than the approved door assembly, needs to be designed then manufactured to fail safe.
Any “plug” should be designed and manufactured be forced tighter onto the frame when the aircraft is pressurised.
Even a child knows that a patch attached to the inside of a punctured paddling pool will hold back the water pressure better than a patch stuck to the outside alone.