The Federal Aviation Administration is aiming to perform the Boeing 737 MAX certification flight in October, after almost six months of being grounded.
Citing Bloomberg, who secured sources involved in the process, the flight(s) are scheduled to occur in October, which corresponds with Boeing’s goals.
Boeing aims to have the 737 MAX back in commercial service by the beginning of the fourth quarter, providing software submission and certification is conducted smoothly.
Killing 346 people over two 737 MAX crashes, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) has been subject to intense review and modification.
For more information on MCAS, see this article:
Investigations covering the 737 MAX have surfaced a significant amount of troubling information, regarding the design and certification of the jet.
Boeing has been busy on software changes to prevent the MCAS system from activating, however was forced to redesign again after a second flaw was found.
Additionally the European Aviation Safety Agency identified a flaw with the autopilot system, which had to be corrected before the jet was considered to be airworthy.
The effort doesn’t stop at certifying the aircraft again though. Boeing has to safely and efficiently return around 600 aircraft to service around the world.
This will only take place once the new software is deployed and each aircraft undergoes a thorough check.
Boeing continues to state they support the FAA and global regulators on the safe return of the 737 MAX.
The FAA says over 110,000 hours have been spent by teams assessing and adjusting factors around the aircraft.
No timeline is being followed to return the aircraft to service, however Boeing is confident the fourth quarter will see operational status.
In an effort to truly ensure all aspects are covered (systems, operation and training), the FAA plans to test the 737 MAX using pilots with little 737 experience.
Simulators will be used for this testing and the pilots will be assessed on how they respond to abnormal situations.
Although its unclear where these pilots will be sourced from, it’s known that major airlines are working with authorities to check the aircraft.
The last part of this equation is determining what training will be required to fly the 737 MAX.
From the beginning Boeing has marketed the aircraft as an easy upgrade, thanks to its commonality with previous 737 generations.
A preliminary decision has been chosen in favour of no simulator training, instead only a digital differences course presented on an iPad or computer.
It’s worth noting a final decision hasn’t been made, however it’ll be interesting to see what other regulators decide on.
As much as Boeing wants to have the aircraft mostly flying by the end of the year, it’s dependent on whether certification occurs smoothly.
Additionally, some airlines will be hesitant to be the first to return the aircraft to service.
A sign of minimal confidence? Not necessarily. Airlines will want to safely and efficiently prepare the aircraft to become airborne again and this involves maintenance, removal of storage gear and final checks.
Boeing cannot afford for anything to go wrong when the aircraft returns to service. Another mishap with the 737 MAX, no matter how big or small, will spark enormous media attention.
Once the Boeing 737 MAX crisis is over, the aircraft will become a significant page in the history of aviation and its safety procedures.
A large amount of changes are to be expected after this ordeal and Boeing will be handling many years of media and financial impacts.
Once re-certified, would you feel comfortable flying on the Boeing 737 MAX?
Those are all interesting comments, but the real problem with Boeing is that these new upstart yuppy engineers,
both the hardware most most significantly the softwsare
yahoos, got away from what has been Boeing baseline
philosophy, contrary to Air-Bus, namely ONE BUTTON
ON THE STICKS KILLS ALL THAT AUTOMATION B.S.
and lets the pilot fly by the seat of his pants as the default
mode… Idiot foreign operators like the ones that failed to
train their crews adequately, remind me of an incident in
the Midwest where the USAF was training some “Arabic” (name withheld to protect the guilty). This
brilliant specimen learning to fly one of our advanced
fighters, rented a mice upscale SUV to do a little weekend touring.. He promptly was involved in a very
nasty high speed wreck… He was incensed that the
AUTPILOT failed when he went to the back of the vehicle to get a drink.
There’s clearly a lot more wrong with this 50-year old design than software. The engines are mounted too far forward and upward, anyone can see this leads to Center of Gravity (CG) issues. But further, this “new design that isn’t new” causes a strong pitch-up moment at low speed and high power (e.g. right after take-off). Boeing tried to save time and development costs while chasing Airbus, and 346 lives later the real problem has surfaced. MCAS would never have been necessary if proper aerodynamic design principles had been obeyed. It is a software “patch” on a hardware “bug”. Issues about AOA sensors and software “authority” are sideshows. Boeing will likely be found liable in the hundreds of lawsuits to follow. Boeing will try to have the trials moved overseas, but they seem to have not recognized that this is now a global issue. Does any company have the right to jeopardize lives to make or save money?
Please see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfNEOfEGe3I
Across the aviation spectrum re: the Max, there appears to be a pro active tilt to the conversation of bringing this plane back to service ASAP! This plane whatever Boeing chooses to rename it should never be allowed to fly.
The Ethiopian and Lionair accidents happened because the pilots did not follow established non-normal check lists for runaway stabilizer. All they had to do was to flip the stab trim cut-out switches on the throttle stand. It does not matter if MCAS, AoA vane, autopilot or something else causes the stabilizer trim motor to run in a non-normal way. The trim wheels rotate and make noise and if the airplane responds in an abnormal way, all you have to do is to flip the cut out switches. The time is of the essence, which is why the stab trim runaway check list is a recall check list.
Sam, I watch your youtube channel quite a bit and enjoy it! However, I read your article stating “The Federal Aviation Administration is aiming to perform the Boeing 737 MAX certification flight in October, after almost six months of being grounded.”. You site Bloomberg as the source of this info. I read the Bloomberg article, and yes this might be semantics, but that article state “The Federal Aviation Administration is likely to conduct its certification flight for Boeing Co.’s 737 Max in October.”
There is a big difference between a person saying that the FAA is aiming to complete the test, meaning the FAA has a schedule and working to get the tests completed and you have knowledge that they will do so, verses, the FAA is likely to, which is an opinion.
Again, I like your youtube channel, but I had to say I think your article is misleading!
Here’s the honest truth the Global Standard for any aircraft manufacture triple redundancy systems On each new aircraft as well as there need to be a global broad for new aircraft type certification from now on
They really could have built the plane different, without using MCAS at all. All you would have to do is train pilots to fly it. They would be fully able to control the nose pitch under acceleration, as one pilot demonstrated on YouTube. They could have designed it to reduce power a fixed percentage, if the pitch is too steep, forcing the nose down, but not taking away so much power that the plane could not hold altitude or make smaller gains. Or, like the “bells and whistles” models, they could have had the warning indicator, that warns of conflicting readings from the two AOA sensors, leaving the pilot to choose which one is correct, like pretty much all of the US planes are equipped. Something like that should be standard on all of the planes and not optional. Safety is never optional with passengers!
The insensitivity Boeing showed the victims of the crashes, and basically pushing an aircraft through to production even though they knew of faults in their product,that willingness to gamble with people’s lives for financial gain was so fairly evident i personally prefer not to fly an aircraft like the 737max. Criminal negligence is too lenient a term, it was manslaughter.